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Introduction 
 
In the crypt of San Pietro in Ciel d’Oro in Pavia, the same church in which 
Augustine’s remains are interred, lies the tomb of Boethius. The influence of 
Augustine on this great synthesizer of Hellenic and Christian thought, despite 
claims to the contrary, should be clear to anyone reading the Consolation of 
Philosophy. The similarity between both thinkers’ attempts to conceive divine 
eternity is a case in point. Throughout the Confessions, we observe Augustine 
espousing the limits of the human’s ability to know God qua God and appealing 
to analogy and image, which his theology of the Trinity and philosophy of the 
soul require. So too does Boethius claim that all things are known according to 
the capacity of the knower, a claim now referred to as the “Modes of Cognition 
Principle.” For both Augustine and Boethius, there is an appropriate, though 
always limited way for the human to understand the divine. While, any human 
conception of divine eternity will always be limited, imperfect, and incomplete, 
both in Boethius’ Consolation and in Augustine’s Confessions one finds that 
divine eternity is best conceived from our limited human point of view in terms 
of an all-encompassing present.  
 In the following, I will discuss Augustine’s description of time and relate 
this to Boethius’ explanation of the distinction between time and eternity. I will 
then connect this distinction to Augustine’s understanding of memory as an 
image of eternity, showing that the analogy between God and the human with 
reference to time involves a comparison not between eternity and time, but 
rather, between eternity and a limited experience of eternity within the mind and 
its distension: time is not the image of eternity, the human mind is, particularly 
its power of memory (memoria). The accounts of time and eternity of both 
thinkers provide, I believe, evidence for Augustine’s influence on and importance 
for the thought of Boethius. Both figures describe the past and future as united in 
the present under the divine purview of God. 
 
 
 
 2 
Distensio Animae 
 
Book 11 of Augustine’s Confessions contains Augustine’s well-known and 
studied attempt to describe and explore the nature of time. The argument in Book 
11, however, is less an attempt to define time than it is an explanation of our 
distance and distinction from the eternal God and of our ability through the 
power of memory to come to know something of His eternity. Augustine thereby 
provides a marvelous phenomenology of time.
1
 Wondering where and how the 
past and future exist, since the former has passed away and the latter is yet to 
come, the Doctor of Grace concludes that there really is in fact only one tense: 
the present. He writes, “What is by now evident and clear is that neither future 
nor past exists, and it is inexact language to speak of three times – past, present, 
and future.”2 Because neither the past nor the future exists, and the present is 
continually fleeing towards non-being, time, Augustine argues, is a kind of 
measuring or grasping activity whereby the rational being unites these tenses in 
the mind: the past is present in remembering (meminit), the present is present in 
attending (adtendit), and the future is present in expecting (expectat).
3
 Augustine 
writes, “Perhaps it would be exact to say: there are three times, a present of 
things past, a present of things present, a present of things to come”; that is, to the 
extent that past and future exist, they exist in the present.
4
 For the human subject, 
when neither remembering nor expecting, these times, past and future, seem not 
to exist at all. As Teske explains, “Past and future, then, are somewhere, but 
wherever they are, they exist only as present. The things themselves have passed 
away.”5 Augustine argues that past and future, therefore, only exist within the 
human soul:  
 
In the soul there are these three aspects of time, and I do not see them 
anywhere else. The present considering the past is the memory, the 
present considering the present is immediate awareness, the present 
considering the future is expectation. If we are allowed to use such 
language, I see three times, and I admit they are three.
6
  
 
                                                          
1
 On Augustine’s phenomenology of time, see Simo Knuuttila, “Time and Creation in Augustine,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. David Vincent Meconi and Elenore Meconi 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 81-97, at 93 ff. 
2
 Augustine. Confessions, 11.20. Hereafter, Conf. Citations give the book and then the chapter. For 
the text in English I use Augustine. Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991). For the text in Latin I use Augustine, Corpus Augustinianum Gissense, ed. 
Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 1995). 
3
 See Augustine, ibid, 11.28: “For the mind expects and attends and remembers.”  
4
 Augustine, Conf., 11.20. 
5
 Roland J. Teske, Paradoxes of Time in Saint Augustine (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette 
University Press, 1996), 25. Teske continues: “[Augustine] insists that it is now plain and clear that 
neither the past nor the future exist and that it is not correct to say that there are three times: past, 
present, and future.” Ibid, 26. 
6
 Augustine, Conf., 11.20. 
 3 
When one is conscious of time as, for example, in the attempt to measure time or 
to compare lengths of time, the past or future that is measured is made present to 
the soul. As Einstein compares sitting on a hot stove with sitting with a pretty 
girl, these past images are called forth from the wellspring of memory, and 
attention is directed towards them as the objects for measuring judgment in the 
present.
7
 Teske notes that “Augustine has, then, located the three times in the 
mind in present memory, intuition, and expectation.”8 As Angus Johnston 
explains, the contradiction surrounding the existence of times that no longer are, 
“can be most properly held together in the soul.”9 That is, the past and future 
have no existence outside of the power of the rational being to conjure them out 
of oblivion and futurity and summon them before the inspection of the mind. 
Whether consciously in the light of present attention, or in potency, waiting to be 
called forth, the past and future exist in memory in the human soul.  
 Augustine calls this activity of making present to the mind the past and 
future a ‘disentio animae.’10 In measuring time, the mind is distended, or 
extended (distentio) across temporal moments, which no longer have any 
independent existence. Robert Jordan summarizes that for Augustine “Time is a 
relation, with a foundation in successive states of finite or limited being, whose 
measurement is a cognitive act, terminating in the ‘distentio’ of the mind.”11 
According to Charlotte Gross: “Augustine argues that time is to be found in the 
measuring mind. As he concludes, time is a distension or extension of mind 
(distensio animi), a sort of temporal ‘stretching’ of the rational soul produced by 
the mental operations of remembering, attending, and anticipating.”12 Already we 
see for Augustine that these operations of remembering, attending, and 
anticipating, are all activities of the soul’s power of ‘memory’ - memoria. Thus 
the memory is not limited to recollecting or re-presenting the past only, as we 
now presently use the term. Memory, for Augustine, is the particular power of 
the mind or soul that can summon these tenses into the present.
13
 In potency, or 
subconsciously, all time is presently united in the soul. 
 Many have noted the negative connotations of this distensio animae, 
arguing that the need for such a distention betrays the difference and distinction 
between God and creatures. Teske notes that “The Latin distensio is a medical 
term that refers to a condition of the body and bears a decidedly negative 
                                                          
7
 Einstein is supposed to have once said, “Put your hand on a hot stove for a minute, and it seems 
like an hour. Sit with a pretty girl for an hour, and it seems like a minute. That’s relativity.” 
8
 Teske, Paradoxes of Time, 26. 
9
 Angus Johnston, “Time as a Psalm in Augustine,” Animus 1 (December, 1996). 
http://www.mun.ca/animus/1996vol1/johnston.html (October, 2012). 
10
 At the time of this publication, I have not been able to consult the recent monograph, David van 
Dusen, The Space of Time: A Sensualist Interpretation of Time in Augustine, Confessions X to XII 
(Leiden: Brill, 2014). 
11
 Robert Jordan, “Time and Contingency in Augustine,” in Augustine: A Collection of Critical 
Essays, ed. R.A. Markus (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1972), 272. 
12
 Charlotte Gross, “Augustine’s Ambivalence About Temporality: His Two Accounts of Time,” 
Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8 (1999): 129-148, at 130. 
13
 See Chadwick’s footnote 12 in Chadwick, Confessions, 185. 
 4 
connotation.”14 The argument is that in the distention, the human mind is 
stretched out over temporal moments; it is a laborious protraction for the finite 
and temporal human mind, a stretch which is unnecessary for God. God does not 
require such an act of the mind to attend to the past and future since everything, 
as we shall see, is eternally present to Him. We, however, are distracted from 
eternal things, and in the focus on passing temporal succession, we require a 
unification of the fleeting moments to think beyond the content of our immediate 
sensation. Thus, in the distension of the mind, we struggle to transcend or unify 
the division of our finitude, to reach beyond, both backwards and forwards, the 
mere fleeting present in which we live out our lives. 
 Although the distention of the mind is indicative of human finitude and 
our difference from God, I argue that it is not altogether negative. Rather, it is 
that act that allows one to perceive at all by unifying temporal moments into one 
conception. Gross writes, “The expression distensio animi thus refers to the time 
of mind itself – for the soul’s extendedness makes possible the existence of past 
and future together in the present – and also, considered as a spiritual activity, 
quite literally describes the condition of the soul in perceiving and measuring 
time.”15 This is true, but the distention occurs not only when we consciously try 
to measure time, but also subconsciously when we perceive anything at all. When 
reading this page, one attends to the letters and words in temporal succession. 
However, as one’s eyes move along the page, only ever attending to two or three 
words in any present moment, one retains the previous words in one’s memory 
and anticipates those to come. If we did not do the former, a sentence’s meaning 
would not be comprehended; if we failed to do the latter, we would not continue 
reading. Reading itself requires that the mind hold together and unify past, 
present, and future in order to comprehend the meaning of a text.  
 Augustine uses the example of singing a psalm to illustrate this point. 
Discussing Augustine’s De vera religione, Teske writes, “In the same work he 
compares the passing beauty of the whole temporal order to that of a song, 
arguing that it is just as unreasonable to want temporal things not to pass away as 
to want the individual notes of a song not to pass away, but to sound forever. He 
admits, nonetheless, that no human mind can see the whole temporal order as we 
can hear the whole of a song.”16 Here, it is the nature of the notes of the song to 
pass. Our experience of the song, however, as a unity, requires that we hold these 
bygone notes together in the present in a different way: they do not all resound at 
once in one’s mind in some cacophonous mishmash, but there is a presence of the 
past and future together with the present.
17
 The same is true of any experienced 
                                                          
14
 Teske, Paradoxes of Time, 29. Teske continues: “The prefix dis- in distentio, and in many other 
compounds, has a negative connotation. While ‘attention’ or ‘intention’ are good or neutral, 
‘distention’ is clearly negative.” Ibid, 26. 
15
 Gross, Augustineʾs Ambivalence, 142. 
16
 Teske, Paradoxes of Time, 31. 
17
 See ibid, 36: “In order to grasp any meaning in the sounds of the verse we have to hold on to 
what has just sounded while we hear the present sound and look forward to the coming sound, and 
we have to synthesize the sequence of these sounds which we hold before our mind’s attention. 
 5 
temporal object: its unity is brought together by the mind. This is what makes the 
experience possible.  
 Without a unification of the fleeting moments of sense experience, we 
should be surprised by the appearance of new things every instant. A dinner 
companion sitting across the table would appear to be a continually different and 
new person as he changes throughout each present moment. As Cratylus 
observed, we cannot step into a river even once, since there never is ‘a river’: 
there is just a constant flow of change, never coalescing into a particular, unified 
object. However, we are not confused by the movement evident in sense 
experience. That is, we naturally unify the past with the present when we turn our 
attention to any object of perception; this unification does not occur in sensation 
itself, which only presents us with infinitely divisible moments, but rather, it 
occurs in the mind. Further included in this unification is the expectation that 
these objects continue into the future. We should be surprised should our dinner 
companion vanish into thin air mid-way through the antipasto. Even when 
unconscious of this expectation, we presently expect him to endure into the 
future. Nor do we think our colleague a different person once the dessert arrives: 
we retain the past within our present perception. Our attention to any thing in the 
present already carries with it, even if subconsciously, a present awareness of its 
past and a present expectation of its future; perception would be impossible 
without such a unification. Thus, the distensio animae is at work, even before we 
are conscious of it and try to measure lengths of time.  
 Now imagine that we could draw together the whole past of all things 
that could possibly be experienced, and that we could also intend to them all at 
once. Now add to that the pulling into our present attention all future moments as 
well, not just as vague expectation, but as infallibly accurate presentness. By such 
an image, one begins to attain, as far as the limited human is able, to an 
experience of divine eternity—to have a complete distention from which no 
moment is missing and which is perfectly accurate and complete, to be perfectly, 
completely, accurately, and truly, present at every moment. This is Augustine’s 
human image of divine eternity. 
 
Memoria: an Image of Eternity in the Mind 
 
It is important to note here that Augustine does not understand time itself as an 
image of eternity. As Gross points out, in the Confessions, “Augustine’s ontology 
of time is noteworthy for its departure from Plotinus. If in earlier writings he sees 
time as an ‘image’ or ‘vestige’ of eternity (cf. Tim. 37d; Enn. 3.7.11), from the 
Confessions forward, he will stress the radical contrast between the two.”18 
                                                                                                                                                
That attention endures, and by its enduring it produces the extendedness or distension of the mind 
which is time and is a necessary condition for our perceiving any temporal object, such as the verse 
of Ambrose’s hymn.” See also Gross, Augustineʾs Ambivalence, 141: “In the recitation of a psalm, 
for example, intentio (attentio) or present attention is directed simultaneously towards the (non-
existent) future in expectation and the (non-existent) past in memory.” 
18
 Gross, Augustineʾs Ambivalence, 134. 
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According to Teske, “In an earlier work Augustine had followed Plotinus and 
Plato in calling time the sign or vestige of eternity, though that designation is not 
found in Confessions. In the Confessions, the emphasis is entirely on the contrast 
between eternity and time.”19 However, whereas scholars often point to the 
distinction between time and eternity in Augustine to show the vast difference 
between God and the human, I will argue that in the comparison between 
Augustine’s discussion of divine eternity and the image of this eternity through 
the power of human memoria, we see not only our separation from God, but also 
our connection and relation to Him. Augustine holds that there are limited ways 
according to which the human can understand or have access to the divine. In his 
discussion of time and eternity, he shows how memoria, not time, is an image of 
eternity.  
 Some scholars argue that there is no comparison possible between human 
temporality and divine eternity, and thus, no conception of eternity can be 
achieved. Herman Hausheer states that “There is no comparison between an ever 
fixed eternity ... and a time that is never fixed.”20 Our experience of time is ours 
and has no divine counterpart. James Wetzel is right to emphasize that “there is 
no God-like experience of time for humans to covet. It is not that God has an 
experience of timelessness instead, but more that time is not a matter of what 
God experiences.... Apart from finitude the experience of time is not 
intelligible.”21 Just as we can say that our experience of weakness is not related 
or analogous to God’s weakness, since God experiences no weakness, we can 
also say that our experience of time has no relation to God’s experience of time 
since God does not experience time. Augustine emphasizes this point:  
 
Who can lay hold on the heart and give it fixity, so that for some little 
moment it may be stable, and for a fraction of time may grasp the 
splendour of a constant eternity? Then it may compare eternity with 
temporal successiveness which never has any constancy, and will see 
there is no comparison possible. It will see that a long time is long only 
because constituted of many successive movements which cannot be 
simultaneously extended. In the eternal, nothing is transient, but the 
whole is present.
22
 
 
 However, it is our limited experience of eternity, not our experience of 
time, that is analogous to divine eternity. Certainly there are human limits to 
understanding eternity, but this is not to say that there can be no comparison. 
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 Teske, Paradoxes of Time, 33-34.  
20
 Herman Hausheer, “St. Augustine’s Conception of Time,” The Philosophical Review 46, no. 5 
(Sept. 1937): 503-512, 509-10. James Wetzel too adds that “there is no analogy between divine and 
human manners of knowing time. The content of the knowledge may be comparable (as 
imperfection is comparable to perfection), but the manner of having is not.” James Wetzel, “Time 
After Augustine,” Religious Studies 31, no. 3 (Sept., 1995): 341-357, at 351. 
21
 Wetzel, “Time,” 351. 
22
 Augustine, Conf., 11.11. 
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Donald Ross points to Augustine’s description of the heaven of heavens as being 
extended throughout time, but not experiencing sequentiality; “Time may be 
extended without being sequential.”23 He claims that the heaven of heavens is 
“the only genuine representative of a kind of being which must be described in 
terms of time as it really is.”24 I do not disagree with his arguments, but I would 
add, however, that the memory qua memory, prior to its activity, is also 
representative of a kind of being that transcends time and sequentiality.
25
 How 
else could Augustine, and the Augustinian tradition, claim that the memory is an 
image of the divine eternity of the first person of the Trinity? In fact, to say there 
is no analogy between the human and the divine is to render Augustine’s 
philosophy of the soul and theology of the Trinity unintelligible. Augustine 
instructs his readers that the best way for them to understand the Trinity is to 
“reflect upon the triad within their own selves.”26 One finds that one possesses 
three powers united and inseparable within oneself: “one life, one mind, and one 
essence.”27 In the Confessions, these three aspects are being, knowing, and 
willing.
28
 Augustine says that “this fact is certain to anyone by introspection.”29 
In the later De Trinitate, Augustine refers to these three powers as memory, 
understanding, and will.
30
 As Bonaventure writes, adopting the Augustinian 
image of the triune God in the soul, “Consider, therefore, the activities of these 
three powers and their relationships, and you will be able to see God through 
yourself as through an image; and this indeed is to see through a mirror in an 
obscure manner.”31 In the discussion of time in the Confessions, of these three 
the focus is on memory. 
 As noted above, although our contemporary usage of the word ‘memory’ 
is reserved for recalling past things only, memoria, for Augustine and the 
medievals, is the power of the mind that attends and also presents past memories 
and expectations of the future to its attention.
32
 Augustine writes,  “I combine 
                                                          
23
 Donald Ross, “Time, the Heaven of Heavens, and Memory in Augustine’s Confessions,” 
Augustinian Studies 22 (1991): 191-205, at 196.  
24
 Ross, “Time,” 199. 
25
 Ross adds at the end of his paper that the memory as well as the heaven of heavens experiences 
time without sequence, but does not elaborate on this point and insofar as he does, he connects this 
character of memory to the doctrine of divine illumination, not to the first person of the Trinity, 
God the Father. See Ross, “Time,” 201-202. 
26
 Augustine, Conf., 13.11. 
27
 Augustine, Conf., 13.11. 
28
 That is, “esse, nosse, velle.” 
29
 Augustine, Conf., 13.11. 
30
 Augustine, De Trinitate., 10.18: “Haec igitur tria, memoria, intellegentia, voluntas.” For the text 
in Latin I use Augustine, Corpus Augustinianum Gissense, ed. Cornelius Mayer (Basel: Schwabe, 
1995). 
31
 Bonaventure, Itinerarium., 3.1. I use the text in Bonaventure, The Journey of the Mind to God, 
trans. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993). 
32
 Other examples include Bonaventure, who adopts this Augustinian image of the Trinity, and in 
particular in the Itinerarium develops Augustine’s thoughts on the power of memory. There, he 
writes: “The function of the memory is to retain and represent not only present, corporeal, and 
temporal, but also successive, simple, and everlasting things. It retains the past by remembrance, 
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with past events images of various things, whether experienced directly or 
believed on the basis of what I have experienced; and on this basis I reason about 
future actions and events and hopes, and again think of all these things in the 
present.”33 Remembrance of the past, attention to the present, and anticipation of 
the future are all activities of memory. The memory has a power to transcend all 
time; past, present, and future are all present to the soul in memory, and prior to 
its activity, which brings any of these moments to attention, all of these tenses are 
present in the memory as in a vast reservoir. 
 We have seen that it is not entirely true to say that past and future are 
entirely non-existent, for they exist as present memory and present expectation 
by the power of the mind. However, Augustine argues that even before memories 
and expectations are called to attention, they exist subconsciously within the 
wellspring of memory, ready to be called forth for inspection. Somehow, the past 
and future are present to the human mind subconsciously, or in potency—
otherwise these times could never be recalled or anticipated and brought to the 
attention of the human being in the present. Augustine refers to “the abyss of 
human consciousness” (Conf., 10.2) and the “fields and vast places of memory” 
(Conf., 11.8), as a kind of “storehouse” and “receptacle” from which an image 
“emerges from its hiding places” (Conf., 11.8). “Memory’s huge cavern, with its 
mysterious secret, and indescribable nooks and crannies” (Conf., 11.8), is an 
“independent storehouse” (Conf., 11.8), a “vast hall” and “treasure-house” 
(Conf., 11.8) containing images and principles within its “broad plains and caves 
and caverns” (Conf., 11.17). He writes that “the vast capacity of memory” (Conf., 
11.9), contains “wonderful storerooms” (Conf., 11.9) and “secret caverns” (Conf., 
11.10); it is the “stomach of the mind” (Conf., 11.13). The memory is a “vast and 
infinite profundity. Who has plumbed its bottom?” (Conf., 11.8). Augustine here 
uses many spatial images to convey the vast capacity of memory to contain, 
though in some dark and mysterious way, things that remain hidden to our 
consciousness. 
 Thus, Augustine argues that the memory is a kind of wellspring from 
which the past, present, and future can be drawn. Prior to calling forth memories 
to attention, they somehow exist within the memory, existing in potency in the 
present despite their temporally past character. This power of the memory is a 
limited human mode of approximating God’s being outside of time—His 
eternality. This approximation between divine eternity and the human soul is 
possible because in the soul’s powers we have something akin to eternity: the 
memory, which prior to its activity contains all time in potential. This is one of 
                                                                                                                                                
the present by receiving things into itself, and the future by foresight” (Bonaventure, Itin. 3.2). He 
continues: “In its first activity, the actual retention of all things in time—past, present, and future—
the memory is an image of eternity, whose indivisible present extends itself to all times.” 
Bonaventure, Itin., 3.2. See also Bonaventure, Q.D. de trin., q. 5, a. 1: “These exist in the soul 
simultaneously in such a way that those things which occur in succession in distinct moments of 
time are united and bound together in the soul, which is a spiritual substance.” I use the text in St. 
Bonaventure, Works of Saint Bonaventure 3: Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity, 
trans. Zachery Hayes, O.F.M, D. Th. (New York: The Franciscan Institute, 2000). 
33
 Augustine, Conf., 10.8. 
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many senses in which the human is created in the image of God.
34
  Augustine 
refers to the memory as a receptacle in which all time is united together, just as 
all time is present to God all at once. The memory is potentially all times and any 
time. In this way, this power of memory in the soul images the first person of the 
Trinity and partakes in divine eternity.
35
 
 
The Limits of the Mental Image of Eternity 
  
There are four differences between the human power of memory and divine 
eternity that I will describe briefly in the following. First, the discursive activity 
of the power of memory is carried out and actualized in a successive manner. 
Whereas the human’s use of memory is sequential, God’s “knowledge admits no 
transient element.”36 Augustine claims that the very act of attention undergoes 
change as various things are brought to it successively.
37
 When you think of your 
tenth birthday party, remember what you had for breakfast this morning, and look 
forward to Thanksgiving dinner etc., you transcend the limitations of the present 
moment. The memory contains these images within its vast storehouse, but they 
proceed sequentially.
38
 Discussing how he knows the meanings of words 
Augustine writes, “I entrusted them to my mind as if storing them up to be 
produced when required ... they were already in the memory, but so remote and 
pushed into the background, as if in most secret caverns, that unless they were 
dug out by someone drawing attention to them, perhaps I could not have thought 
of them.”39 The activity of digging out memories happens in succession in time.40 
                                                          
34
 Augustine, Conf., 11.8: “I will therefore rise above that natural capacity in a step by step ascent 
to him who made me. I come to the fields and the vast palaces of my memory.” 
35
 See Bonaventure, Itin. 3.2: “And thus it is clear from the activities of the memory that the soul 
itself is an image of God and a similitude so present to itself and having Him so present to it that it 
actually grasps Him and potentially ‘is capable of possessing Him and of becoming a partaker in 
Him.’” 
36
 Augustine, Conf., 12.15. 
37
 See Augustine, Conf., 12.15: “Again, surely you would not deny what he speaks to me in my 
inner ear, that the expectation of future events becomes direct apprehension when they are 
happening, and this same apprehension becomes memory when they have passed. But every act of 
attention which undergoes change in this way is mutable, and anything mutable cannot be eternal.” 
38
 Again, Augustine also describes this difference in comparison to how one experiences a song. In 
any given moment the listener retains the previous notes and expects what is to come. Even one 
who knows the song well does not contain it all together at once. He writes, “You know them in a 
much more wonderful and much more mysterious way. A person singing or listening to a song he 
knows well suffers a distension or stretching in feeling and in sense-perception from the 
expectation of future sounds and the memory of past sounds. With you it is otherwise.” Conf. 
11.31. 
39
 Augustine, Conf., 10.10. 
40
 Gilson also notes this limit: “Our inability to perceive things simultaneously and in the unity of 
an indivisible act is primarily the inability of things to exist simultaneously in a permanent and 
stable unity. Only things which cannot coexist follow one another. Hence, in order to form an idea 
of eternity it is not enough to think of the universe as a familiar song and to imagine a boundless 
consciousness which always knows exactly how much of that song has been sung; it is far beyond 
any such mind as this that God subsists, for He is the Creator of every mind. For him there is 
 10 
Our conscious drawing the past and future out from the depths of the memory 
into the present is still a discursive activity, and is therefore only an 
approximation of divine eternity, but it is an image nonetheless because these 
images are contained within the memory prior to their being summoned forth, 
and the power is able, in a way, to transcend temporality insofar as the images 
can be of the past, present, or future. Even though the human possesses a power 
that images divine eternity in the power of the memory, this power is still 
actualised in time, and what is summoned to it from the past and what is called to 
its attention as expectation of the future still proceeds in a discursive manner.
41
 
 
 
Second, the attention of the memory on a past moment precludes its 
ability also to consider a different past or future event at the same time, and thus 
not all times can be brought to consciousness or actualized at once. God’s 
knowledge, on the other hand, is “not of one thing at one moment and of another 
thing at another moment, but is concurrent without any temporal 
successiveness.”42 Even though the memory is capable of running easily between 
past, present, and future, there is still a “tension” between these sequential 
moments.
43
 They cannot be held together in unity in consciousness or actuality; 
as Bonaventure says, the conscious memory lacks the perfect simultaneity of the 
divine eternity.
44
 The memory always contains more than what we can 
successively and discursively draw out from within it in any conscious act.  
 Third, even though the memory can transcend the succession of time in 
its ability to think future, then past, then future again, this course that the memory 
decides to run and the order and veracity of the memory’s activities need not 
correspond to an objective truth or to the objective temporal sequence; while this 
gives us creative power (another image of the divine), whatever sequence the 
mind chooses, this order still occurs in a temporal series, a kind of meta-
succession, or over-arching temporal progression in which the memory is 
actualized. While the memory itself, as a reservoir and power images eternity, to 
                                                                                                                                                
neither past nor future; His knowledge of things is one and undivided, like the act itself by which 
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plumb its depths, however, is to engage in discursive activity independent of an 
objective order.  
 Fourth, in addition to the questionable accuracy and order of the images 
that the human memory calls forth, there are things that we do not know. We do 
not remember, attend, or expect with perfect accuracy. Augustine writes,  
 
Certainly if there were a mind endowed with such great knowledge and 
prescience that all things past and future could be known in the way I 
know a very familiar psalm, this mind would be utterly miraculous and 
amazing to the point of inducing awe. From such a mind nothing of the 
past would be hidden, nor anything of what remaining ages have in 
store, just as I have full knowledge of the psalm I sing.
45
  
 
Here, we see an image of what a perfection of the memory would be like, to 
Augustine’s mind, from a human perspective. It would be like knowing eternity 
in the way we know a well-known psalm.
46
 
 We see, therefore, how we are not severed completely from touching on 
God’s eternity. The distension of the mind, while highlighting the vast difference 
between God and the human, also shows how an image of divine eternity is 
present in the human soul in the power of memory, despite its limitations and 
differences. 
 
Boethius’ Modes of Cognition Principle 
 
We will now turn to Boethius, to show how he understands divine eternity and 
temporality and how he draws upon Augustinian conceptions explained above. 
We will first explain a crucial principle upon which his understanding of eternity 
hinges. As Aristotle tells us in the De Anima, Plato held that “like … is known by 
like.”47 For the Platonists generally, knowledge is an assimilation of the thinker to 
the object of thought; the quality of thought depends upon the quality of its 
object. According to this doctrine, one attempting to know the first principle is 
confronted with an impossibility unless he can transcend the limitations of the 
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human mind. Either human limitation condemns to failure all attempts to 
understand God qua God (the object of thought transcends our ability to 
comprehend), or the human must be drawn up into the object of her thought, 
transcending her limited nature to the point where her thinking is assimilated to 
its object.
48
 Because God has no limits, the assimilation of knower to known 
must involve a loss of the distinction between the two, a loss of self described in 
Plotinian henosis.
49
  
 However, Chadwick notes that “With Iamblichus and Proclus, [Boethius] 
affirms that the knowledge possessed by God operates on a different plane from 
human knowledge.”50 Boethius, following Ammonius, who probably received the 
doctrine from Iamblichus, asserts that this Platonic position is wrong, and thus 
proposes something rather different: knowledge is not an assimilation of the 
knower to the object of thought, but rather, the quality of knowledge is dependant 
on the quality of the knower. This has been called the ‘Modes of Cognition 
Principle,’ whereby things are known not according to the nature of the objects of 
knowledge, but rather, they are known according to the mode of the knower.
51
 
John Marenbon adds, “Statements not unlike the Modes of Cognition Principle 
are found in Proclus and Ammonius, although there is no parallel to the way 
Philosophy works it out in V.4 [of the Consolation of Philosophy].”52 In the 
Consolation, Lady Philosophy says:  
 
You believe thinking things to be other than as they are to be alien to the 
integrity of knowledge. The cause of this mistake is that each thinks that 
all that he knows is known simply by the power and nature of those 
things that are known [(the typical Platonic position)]. Which is 
altogether otherwise: for everything which is known is grasped not 
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according to its own power but rather according to the capability of those 
who know it.
53
 
 
This position prepares the way for the solution to the perceived conflict between 
divine omniscience and human freedom, whereby God’s foreknowledge of all 
human actions seems to preclude the human’s ability to do anything other than 
what God foreknows. This problem forms the context in which the principle is 
introduced. As Thomas McTighe points out, “The key to its solution is the nature 
of divine knowledge, which like all modes of knowing is a function of the nature 
of the knower, not the known.”54 Boethius suggests that while the human cannot 
comprehend God’s eternity in the same way that God understands, nevertheless, 
there is a proper human mode of knowing that can be true, or at least truer than 
some other human attempts to conceive it. Even though the human conception is 
somewhat alien to God’s knowing, this does not affect the status of our 
knowledge as knowledge. 
 We cannot assimilate our minds to the object of knowledge as they are in 
themselves, particularly in this case concerning eternity. That is, according to the 
modes of cognition principle, we cannot know things as they are known by God 
any more than a dog can know things as they are known by a human being. Each 
thinker knows according to its own capacities. Michael Wiitala writes,  
 
Our capacity or way of knowing differs from God’s and cannot 
comprehend his. Consequently a complete solution to the foreknowledge 
and freedom dilemma in which ‘no further doubt would remain’ is 
impossible. A partial solution, however, is possible insofar as we can 
understand Divine simplicity in some way, and Lady Philosophy 
promises to offer such a solution.
55
  
 
Thus, we cannot comprehend eternity as God understands it, but there are truer 
ways in which the human can know according to her own mode of knowing. 
Thinking God’s eternity differently from how it really is need not affect the 
integrity of that thinking, though there are better and worse ways to think it. 
 We should also point out here that the higher modes of thinking include 
the lower. As McTighe highlights, “The principle that the higher includes the 
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lower, which is central to the theory of knowledge, is also operative in the theory 
of eternity and time.”56 Thus God, in knowing in a higher mode, does not exclude 
the lower human mode; higher modes include the lower, but the lower do not 
include the higher.   
 
Temporality, Sempiternity, and Eternity 
 
So how does this principle apply to the human conception of eternity for 
Boethius? Boethius applies the Modes of Cognition Principle in his solution to 
the apparent conflict between divine foreknowledge and human freedom. The 
tension arises when the human being tries to understand eternity either according 
to the divine mode, which is impossible, or according to the wrong human 
analogy. Wiitala writes, “The dilemma arises because the human mind cannot 
comprehend God in his simplicity and as a result must break this simplicity into 
parts which then appear to be inconsistent with one another.”57 Boethius’s 
solution is of course well-known. The wrong way to think about God’s eternality, 
that is, the way that leads to the perceived conflict between divine omniscience 
and human freedom, is to think God’s eternity as an infinite succession or 
perpetuity—as a sempiternity. Boethius says that a sempiternal being “does not 
simultaneously comprehend and embrace the whole space of its life, though it be 
infinite, but it possesses the future not yet, the past no longer.”58 We can imagine 
a being coming into existence, being involved in the motion and change in the 
world, which, however, unlike all other things, would never come to an end; its 
life would continue on forever, like the Highlander, Tolkien’s elves, or Dorien 
Gray if he could have just kept that picture under lock and key. In fact, Augustine 
believes that there are such beings. Angels are not eternal in the divine sense; 
they couldn’t be, given that they are creatures that have beginnings. So too is the 
human soul such a creature. While it is a matter of scholarly debate whether or 
not Augustine believed that the human soul exists before it is born into a body, or 
whether the creation of the soul occurs at the moment of the body’s generation, 
either way, the human soul has a beginning; being immortal, it persists like the 
angel or demon in sempiternal succession.
59
  However, as Marenbon explains, 
“The way God exists, Philosophy goes on to explain, is to exist eternally. Divine 
eternity, she then makes clear, is not a matter of existing during an infinite length 
of time, as the universe does if it lacks beginning and end. Rather, God’s eternity 
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is ‘the whole, simultaneous perfect possession of unbounded life.’”60 Or as 
McTighe notes, “It is one thing to be lead through an endless succession of 
temporal moments. It is quite another to envelop all moments all at once in a total 
presence. The former is perpetuity, the latter eternity.”61  
 It is clear enough that God’s eternity is not sempiternity, for then there 
would be moments apart from Him: God would be in time rather than time being 
in God. Boethius writes:  
 
For whatever lives in time proceeds in the present from the past into the 
future, and there is nothing established in time which can embrace the 
whole space of its life equally, but tomorrow surely it does not yet grasp, 
while yesterday it has already lost. And in this day to day life you live no 
more than in that moving and transitory moment.
62
  
 
To think of God in this way would have God existing in the present, having 
existed in the past, and who, like us, is waiting around for the future to occur. 
Because, however, he, unlike the human, has divine omniscience, he knows all 
things that will come to pass, even though they are not yet present. This creates 
the problem for human freedom. God knew that I would write this paper, and 
until now, he was just waiting around for what he knew would occur to transpire. 
We seem to want, however, in order to feel free in the here and now, to be able to 
prove such a God wrong, that is, not to write the article and have God say, 
“Wow, I thought for sure he would write that paper!” If we cannot do this, we do 
not seem to have real freedom. 
 The conflict arises, however, because we are not thinking of eternity in 
the correct (yet still limited) way according to the human mode of thinking that 
we have available to us. Boethius telegraphs his philosophical answer to the 
problem, as he often does, in the poetry that precedes the discussion: “What 
is, what has been, and what is to come / in one swift mental stab he sees / Him, 
since he only all things sees / The true sun could you call.”63 God sees what is 
past, present, and future in the created temporal order in “one swift mental stab.” 
Just as Fate is the successive unraveling in time of what Providence contains all 
together, so too are all of the moments of time encompassed by the eternal 
standpoint in which they are not successive, but unified. Boethius says that 
“Eternity, then, is the whole, simultaneous and perfect possession of boundless 
life, which becomes clearer by comparison with temporal things.”64  
 Yet, as we have seen, there is a human counterpart to eternity imagined 
in this way. As Elenore Stump and Norman Kretzmann explain:  
 
The existence of a typical existent temporal entity, such as a human 
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being, is spread over years of the past, through the present, and into years 
of the future; but the past is not, the future is not, and the present must be 
understood as no time at all, a durationless instant, a mere point at which 
the past is continuous with the future.
65
  
 
This description of Boethius’s understanding of eternity, taken out of context, 
could easily be mistaken for an accurate description of Augustine’s account of 
human temporality in Confessions. Boethius provides the limited human analogy, 
according to the modes of cognition principle, by which we are better able to 
touch upon eternity; it involves thinking not about sempiternal succession, but 
about all temporal moments in the past, present, and future in terms of the 
present. He suggests, “But if the comparison of the divine and the human present 
is a proper one, just as you see certain things in this your temporal present, so 
[God] perceives all things in his eternal one.”66  
 In C.S. Lewis’ The Screwtape Letters, the demon Screwtape writes to 
Wormwood: 
 
The humans live in time but our Enemy destines them to eternity. He 
therefore, I believe, wants them to attend chiefly to two things, to 
eternity itself, and to the point of time which they call the Present. For 
the Present is the point at which time touches eternity. Of the present 
moment, and of it only, humans have an experience analogous to the 
experience which our Enemy has of reality as a whole; in it alone 
freedom and actuality are offered them.
67
  
 
Lewis is here emphasizing that it is the human experience of the present that 
likens us to the divine and is the tense in which human freedom can be found. By 
conceiving divine knowledge as an all-encompassing present, Boethius attempts 
to solve the apparent contradiction between divine omniscience and human 
freedom. He argues, in the last book of the Consolation, just as one’s seeing a 
man walking and the sun rising in the present causes neither to occur, so too does 
God’s seeing what is future to us but present to Him fail to cause these events. 
The sun rises by necessity, a man walks by choice, but our seeing causes neither, 
yet neither escapes our notice. Boethius writes: 
 
Whatever therefore comprehends and possesses at once the whole 
fullness of boundless life, and is such that neither is anything future 
lacking from it, nor has anything past flowed away, that is rightly held to 
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be eternal, and that must necessarily both always be present to itself, 
possessing itself in the present, and hold as present the infinity of moving 
time.
68
 
 
Understanding God as being present to all events, which from our perspective 
unfold in time as past, present, and future, avoids the problem of God’s perfect 
foreknowledge restricting us from doing other than what he foreknows. As 
Chadwick explains:  
 
For us events fall into past, present, and future time. God is outside time. 
For him the knowledge of temporal events is an eternal present. 
Therefore to affirm God is omniscient does not entail that he holds 
beliefs about acts in advance of their being done; the temporality 
involved in the phrase ‘in advance of’ must be abstracted from the 
discussion.
69
  
 
We, however, are like Oedipus, bound by space and time, and we must learn 
through suffering and temporal succession, whereas Tiresias comprehends the 
whole span of time in one divine Apollonian vision.
70
 The experience of time is 
the result of human limitation, which again, is a natural and necessary property of 
any created thing.
71
 Explaining Augustine’s position, Katherin Rogers writes: “It 
is the temporal creature’s weakness that it exists in time and sees things from its 
own finite point of view. It is God’s strength that He sees all and all ‘at once.’”72 
As Stump explains, “From the eternal viewpoint every temporal event is actually 
happening.”73 We err when we try to conceive God’s eternity according to the 
wrong analogy, that is according to eternal succession rather than the present.
74
 
 The better human way to understand divine eternity is to conceive of God 
as experiencing all temporal events as we experience the present. There are, of 
course, limitations to this view. Wiitala raises the following problem: 
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The only difficulty with Boethius’s characterization of God’s knowledge 
of time is that we cannot imagine what it would be like to simultaneously 
know the same event as eternally present, temporally present, past, and 
future. But why should we think that we can imagine God’s ‘mental 
states’? The reason that we cannot imagine what it would be like to 
simultaneously know the same event as eternally present, temporally 
present, past, and future is that, since we are limited by time, we can only 
imagine things from one perspective at a time.
75
  
 
One sees Wiitala’s point, but the analogy between divine eternity as a present and 
the human experience of the temporal present is richer than it might seem in light 
of Augustine’s account of memory. As we have seen in Augustine, so too does 
the human, through the power of memory, stretch beyond the limitations of the 
present moment to reach out towards the past and future, encompassing and 
unifying them within her present attention. While still a limited, human image, in 
light of the power of memory, which Augustine makes evident, the human soul 
and its divine creator are brought closer together within the analogy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Some scholars have denied Augustine’s influence on Boethius’ conception of 
time and eternity. For example, McTighe asserts:  
 
Boethius’ reflections on time show no trace of the psychological 
approach to time of Plotinus and St. Augustine. Countless commentators 
claim without the slightest evidence to see in Boethius the influence of 
Augustine not only in respect to time and eternity but also many other 
issues. The truth is that Boethius’ account owes nothing to Augustine.76  
 
It is hard not to notice the textual and philosophical similarities, however, 
between Augustine’s and Boethius’ conceptions of time and eternity. In addition 
to the texts citied throughout this paper, Katherin Rogers has also cited many 
other passages in Augustine’s works that make the connection hard to deny.77 
Further, Teske argues: 
 
Boethius (480-525/6), who lived roughly a century after Augustine, is 
rightly credited with having passed on to the later Middle Ages this 
concept of divine eternity as life all at once. He expressed the idea in his 
well-known definition: ‘the perfect possession all at once of unending 
life.’ All the elements of that definition are clearly found in Augustine, 
but before the time of Augustine that concept of eternity is found in no 
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Christian thinker, except perhaps Gregory of Nyssa, who is more 
Augustine’s contemporary than his source …. Augustine, it seems, was 
the first Christian thinker, at least in the West, to have articulated the 
philosophical concept of eternity as a life that is complete all at once in 
the present without any past or future.
78
 
 
Though raised within a different context as a solution to a different problem, 
Boethius’ discussion of divine eternity as an eternal present is an elaboration of 
the view of Augustine. In Book 11 of the Confessions, Augustine contrasts the 
human life, which is lived out in temporal succession, with divine eternity. 
Augustine too suggests that the proper image of eternity is not an everlasting 
sequential sempiternity, but rather, that it is a kind of everlasting present. He 
writes, “Yet, if the present were always present, it would not pass into the past: it 
would not be time but eternity.”79 Like Descartes, who says that we are aware of 
our own imperfection only in relation to some prior notion of perfection, which 
we cannot define but yet can touch with our thought, Augustine says that we are 
aware of the eternal in our own recognition of the limits of the temporal.
80
 When 
discussing God’s words spoken in time in the Gospel, “This is my beloved Son, 
in whom I am well pleased”, Augustine writes, “That voice is past and done with; 
it began and is ended. . . . But the mind would compare these words, sounding in 
time, with your eternal word in silence.”81 Augustine makes the distinction 
explicit: 
 
It is not in time that you precede times. Otherwise you would not precede 
all times. In the sublimity of an eternity which is always in the present, 
you are before all things past and transcend all things future, because 
they are still to come, and when they have come they are past. ‘But you 
are the same and your years do not fail.’ Your ‘years’ neither go nor 
come. Ours come and go so that all may come in succession. All your 
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‘years’ subsist in simultaneity, because they do not change.82 
  
 This analogy, however, is by no means perfect, since the entirety of 
things past and yet to come cannot be present to us in the way that Boethius or 
Augustine suggests that they are present to God.
83
 In fact, it is not quite right to 
call God’s present a ‘present’ at all; the notion of the ‘present’ only is 
comprehensible in the context of a past and future, none of which are 
experienced by God without placing Him back into the time which He 
transcends. Such is the nature of analogy. Nevertheless, an all encompassing 
present is a better image than sempiternal succession, since it more perfectly 
images divine eternity, and avoids the conflict that opposes God’s foreknowledge 
to human freedom.
84
  
 Central to Augustine’s confession is not only the distinction and distance 
between the human and God, but also, and more importantly, the relation and 
connection between Creator and created. As much as our experience of time 
distinguishes us from the Creator, so too does the power of memoria in the 
human soul, the pre-condition of our experience of time, liken us to the eternal 
God. C.S. Lewis once wrote in a letter to Sheldon Vanauken, “Notice how we are 
perpetually surprised at Time.… In heaven’s name, why? Unless, indeed, there is 
something in us which is not temporal.”85 
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 Augustine, Conf., 11.13. 
83
 See Rogers, “Augustine,” 211: “Perhaps ‘present’ does not begin to do justice to God’s eternity 
since ordinarily it does suggest a dimensionless point in time, but no word could really do the job. 
It seems clear that Augustine chooses to use ‘present’ to emphasize that there is no extension in 
God because extension or duration would limit the perfect divine simplicity.” 
84
 In fact, God does not have foreknowledge at all, since there is no ‘fore’ for God. 
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 The Collected Letters of C.S. Lewis, vol. 3, Narnia, Cambridge, and Joy, 1950-1963, ed. Walter 
Hooper (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 2007), 76. 
